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V. C. BALL*
The problem to be treated in this article can be easily described
by means of an illustration. In litigation between A and B, A calls
upon W, a witness who is not a party, to testify to a matter which by
definition we shall say would tend to incriminate W, or which by
definition we shall call a "privileged" communication made by W to
his lawyer, or his physician, or his wife. In every other respect the
testimony called for is unobjectionable. W protests that he should not
be required to answer, correctly stating the reason; and B, who does
not wish the testimony to be part of A's case against B, urges that W's
position is correct. The question whether the matter fits the definition
of privilege turns out to be a difficult one; and the trial judge makes
an understandable error, which we might have made if we did not
control the defining process. The judge rules (incorrectly) that no
privilege applies, and orders W to answer. Confronted with possible
contempt proceedings, W complies, and the evidence is received. A
rule of evidence has been "broken," and W's privilege has been
violated. Again by definition, the result is that B loses the case. The
question to be considered here is whether B has been deprived of any
of B's rights or privileges.
The Ohio answer to the question appears to be "sometimes"; and
after analysis of the principles involved, a comparison with selected
Ohio precedents will be attempted, with some references to results in
other jurisdictions.
For many years, textwriters have separated the rules of evidence
into broad categories based on differences in function. The great bulk
of evidence law consists of rules of exclusion such as the requirement
of relevancy, the requirement of first-hand knowledge, and the hear-
say rule. The underlying purpose of all these is the same. They are
intended to aid in the ascertainment of truth at the trial by allowing
the litigant to protect himself against the admission and use by the
jury of evidence which is insufficiently reliable, or is prejudicial, or
tends to delay or confuse. Evidence of these kinds is excluded because
it would hinder rather than help the jury in its task of finding correct
answers to the factual questions posed to it.
In addition and in contrast to these rules, analysts place rules of
privilege, such as those concerning self-incrimination, or concerning
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communications between attorney and client, or physician and patient.
Again, the distinction is based on underlying purpose. It is conceded
on all hands that the evidence rejected by such rules is not less reliable
than what is admitted, nor more productive of prejudice or delay or
confusion. The privilege shuts the door on truth rather than on un-
truth. The justification for such exceptions to the general compellability
and reception of material tending to throw light on the issues is found
in a different direction. In each case, the reason is thought to lie in an
"outside" interest-outside in the sense that it is unconnected with
the reliability of the evidence and with the interests at stake in the
trial.1 In the case of the physician-patient privilege, for example, the
outside interest is correct diagnosis and cure through willing submis-
sion by the patient to thorough examination and through free and
frank disclosure of the necessary history. The subsequent rejection
of this material at trial, if the patient wishes, is thought to be a reason-
able price to pay for the earlier encouragement and attendant im-
provement in health.
The treatise-writers have not conceded the correctness of these
assumptions about human nature,2 but they have carried them forward
into an analysis of rules of privilege consistent with the function of
protecting this outside interest. This analysis runs as follows: since
privileges constitute an exception to the general rule that all material
evidence is compellable to ascertain the facts at issue, privileges
should be narrowly construed.' This means that they should be held
to the minimum scope necessary for adequate protection of the outside
interest involved. This leads to the conclusion that ordinarily a privi-
lege is "personal"-that is, it exists for the benefit, and solely for
the benefit, of the person or persons having that outside interest. Such
a person is the holder of the privilege, and only he can claim its en-
forcement as a matter of right since it is only his outside interest that
is intended to be protected by it. A litigant, as litigant, has a right to
the enforcement of the rules of exclusion which are designed to guard
the ascertainment of the truth of his claim or defense, but only the
holder of the privilege has a right to the enforcement of a rule of
privilege.4
In the abstract, this description is accepted by the writers, but
the procedure for its implementation has not received equal attention
1 See McCormick, Evidence § 72 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2196 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
2 Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence 22 (1942); McCormick §§ 81, 90,
91, 101, 108; 8 Wigmore § 2380.
3 See In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953).
4 8 Wigmore § 2196.
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and has given rise to the difficulties which are the subject of this
article.
One thoroughly worked-out effort to formulate a procedure for
resolving questions regarding who may assert privileges, applying in
part the principles stated above, is found in the Uniform Rules of
Evidence proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.5
The privileges which will be used are those involving self-incrimina-
tion, communications between attorney and client, physician and
patient, and husband and wife. Only the portion of a Rule pertinent
to the question of standing to assert a privilege will be reproduced.
Rule 7 states the general duty to give evidence: "Except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, . . .no person has a privilege to
refuse to be a witness, and ... no person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose any matter . .. and no person has a privilege that another
shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter .... .
Rule 25: "... [E]very natural person has a privilege, which he
may claim, to refuse to disclose in an action . . . any matter that
will incriminate him. .... "
Rule 26, dealing with the attorney-client privilege, provides that
. the client has a privilege (a) if he is the witness to refuse to
disclose any such communication, and (b) to prevent his lawyer from
disclosing it ....
"The privilege may be claimed by the client in person or by his
lawyer, or if incompetent, by his guardian, or if deceased, by his
personal representative."
Rule 27 creates the physician-patient privilege. The Commis-
sioners first decided not to include it, but reversed that decision and
adopted the privilege as stated in the American Law Institute's Model
Code, so that the format differs slightly from the other Rules. Rule 27
defines the "holder of the privilege" as the patient while alive and his
personal representative after death, and then provides that "a person,
whether or not a party, has a privilege ... to refuse to disclose, and
to prevent a witness from disclosing, a communication, if he claims the
privilege and the judge finds that . . . the claimant is the holder of
the privilege or a person authorized to claim the privilege for him."
Rule 28, dealing with confidential communications between per-
sons married to each other, provides that . . . a spouse who trans-
mitted to the other the information which constitutes the communica-
tion" has a privilege "which he may claim whether or not he is a
party to the action, to refuse to disclose and to prevent the other from
5 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 161 et seq. (1953).
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disclosing communications . . . made in confidence between them
while husband and wife. The other spouse or the guardian of an incom-
petent spouse may claim the privilege on behalf of the spouse having
the privilege." Rule 23 states a similar privilege for the spouse who is
the accused in a criminal case.
Rule 40: "A party may predicate error on a ruling disallowing a
claim of privilege only if he is the holder of the privilege." These
Uniform Rules on privilege have been adopted in substance in New
Jersey; Rule 40 was enacted verbatim. 6
On the points to be considered here, the Commissioners' com-
mentary on the Rules does not supply illustrations. With the caveat
that they represent the writer's interpretation, we should expect that
the Rules would apply in the manner set out in the following examples,
for the reasons given.
Illustration 1: In an action between A and B, W is called upon
by A as a witness to testify to a confidential communication made by
W to W's physician for purposes of treatment. Under Rule 27, W
has a privilege to refuse. If, therefore, the trial judge sustains W in
his refusal, W's privilege has been recognized, and no right of A to
compel evidence in his cause has been denied.
Illustration 2: In the situation in Illustration 1, if the judge
erroneously orders W to testify and for that reason alone W does so,
no right of B, who may have wished the testimony excluded, has been
violated. Under Rule 40, B cannot predicate error upon the ruling.
Whether W's failure to stand upon his refusal and test the judge's
ruling in a contempt proceeding is a waiver of W's privilege is not
material, since B has no legal interest in the protection of W's privilege
nor in the failure to protect it.
Illustration 3: In a lawsuit between A and B, A calls upon B as
a witness to testify to a communication made by B to B's physician,
confidentially and for purposes of treatment. B has a privilege to
refuse; and if the judge sustains him in his refusal, no right of A to
compel testimony has been denied.
Illustration 4: In the situation in Illustration 3, if the judge erro-
neously orders B to testify over his claim of privilege, B may stand
upon his refusal, and test the ruling in the ensuing contempt proceed-
ing. This parallels Illustration 2, except that (1) B has a legal interest
in the contempt proceeding which is distinct from his interest in the
main action between himself and A; and (2) whether B's failure to
6 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:84A-19 to -32 (Supp. 1962). The Uniform Rules on these
privileges have also been enacted in substance in the Virgin Islands. V.I. Code tit. 5,
§§ 853-856 (1957). Rule 40 was enacted verbatim, V.J. Code fit. 5, § 866 (1957).
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stand upon his refusal constitutes a waiver of his privilege must be
decided. By implication, Rule 40 suggests that since B is a party, he
may predicate error in the main action upon the judge's ruling, and
that would include the notion that B's failure to stand out, after the
judge ruled, was not a waiver of his privilege/
Illustration 5: In a lawsuit between A and B, A calls upon W,
B's physician, to testify to a confidential communication made by W
to B for purposes of treatment. Under Rule 27, B has a privilege to
prevent W from disclosing. If B claims it, and the judge sustains him,
B has prevented W from testifying as B is privileged to do, and no
right of A to compel testimony has been denied.
Illustration 6: In the situation in Illustration 5, if the judge erro-
neously orders W to testify over B's claim of privilege, and W obeys,
7 On strict extension of the principle, the procedure to test the privilege is separate
from the main action. It should always be carried up from the trial judge's ruling through
contempt action; and this would dictate the conclusion that failure to stand on the
refusal to disclose terminates the matter, so far as the main action is concerned. See
Frazer v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944), where the court said:
* Frazer, on the other hand, claimed the privilege, but when directed to
answer, complied without further protest. Had he persisted in his refusal to
answer, it would, of course, have been at the hazard of being cited and punished
for contempt, but in the event of punishment he would not have been without
remedy and might have challenged the action of the court by petition for
writ of habeas corpus, or by an appeal from the contempt order. He declined the
hazard. May it thus not be said that though first invoking the privilege he
ended by waiving it? We think this is a logical conclusion.
See also Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 31, 62 N.W.2d 688, 699 (1954):
"Once the privileged matter is produced after objection has been overruled, the question
of correctness of the ruling is moot on appeal."
See also 8 Wigmore § 2270:
Where the complaining party is not the wronged witness, the party has no
ground for complaint. Where the party is the wronged witness, it is arguable
that the same result should follow-that the party witness should not be
permitted, for the purpose of overthrowing the proceedings in the cause, to
complain of error in denying his privilege. The reasoning is that his privilege
as a witness is totally unrelated to his rights as a party, and that the result of
the litigation between the parties should not be distorted by the irrelevant
fact that the witness whose privilege was erroneously denied happened to
be one of the parties. No court has accepted this conclusion, however.
McCormick makes the same point, but ends by saying: "If the adverse party to
the suit is likewise the owner of the privilege, then, while it may be argued that the
party's interest as a litigant has not been infringed, most courts decline to draw so
sharp a line, and permit him to complain of the error." McCormick § 73.
The authors of Model Code of Evidence rule 234, which is identical with Uniform
Rule 40, expressly stated that the holder of the privilege could claim error on its denial
if he were a party. Model Code of Evidence 173 (1942).
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B's privilege to prevent W from testifying has been violated, and
under Rule 40, B may predicate error on the ruling.
Illustration 7: If, in the situation of Illustrations 5 and 6, the
suit is between A and X (B is not a party): B, if present, may claim
his privilege; if B is not present, W is authorized to claim the privi-
lege on behalf of B. If the judge sustains the claim, no right of A to
compel testimony has been denied. If the judge erroneously orders
W to testify and W obeys, B's privilege has been violated, but B has
no remedy. No right of X, who may have wished the testimony ex-
cluded, has been denied, and under Rule 40, X is not entitled to
predicate error upon the ruling.
Illustrations 6 and 7 require further comment. The Rules no-
where state that the physician has any privilege; but it is plain upon
analysis that he does. It is, of course, the privilege of the physician,
as against the State and against A, to obey his duty to B not to dis-
close without B's consent. If, in Illustration 5, A sued the physician
for damages caused A by the physician's not testifying in accordance
with the supposed duty to A to give evidence in A's suit, A could not
recover any more than A could recover against the patient, whose
privilege is expressly stated in the rules. The meaning of the customary
statements that "the privilege is the patient's, and not the physician's,"
and that the patient is the "holder" of it, is that the patient controls
both his own privilege and the physician's; not that the physician has
none. The patient has the power to terminate them both by waiver.
The problem that arises in Illustrations 6 and 7 is how far the physi-
cian's privilege extends. When the judge erroneously orders him to
testify, does he have a privilege to stand out and test the judge's ruling
in a contempt proceeding? It is clear that the patient could do so if he
were the witness; and if the physician as witness does so at the
patient's urging, the patient's act is privileged, since his privilege is
to "prevent" the disclosure. The Rules do not include an explanation
on this point; but the commentary preceding Rules 220 to 223 of the
Model Code of Evidence, on which Uniform Rule 27 is expressly based,
suggests that the physician-witness can stand on his refusal. It states,
in discussing the attorney-client privilege:
If the client is neither the witness, nor a party to the action, he
must rely, first, upon the judge and, second, upon the witness; if
the judge erroneously orders the witness to disregard the privilege
and the witness obeys, the client is remediless.8
To say that the physician-witness has a privilege as against the State
and the litigants to stand out, is not the same as saying that the
S Model Code of Evidence 148 (1942).
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witness' duty to the patient extends that far. Particularly in the case
in which the patient is not a party and not present, difficult problems
arise of reimbursement for the expenses (and perhaps other losses)
involved in defending the contempt proceeding. This may have been
the reason for saying that if the witness obeys the erroneous order,
the holder of the privilege is remedilessf
With this groundwork, we are in a position to examine the han-
dling of privilege problems in Ohio. Two things should be noted at
the outset. First, probably no state-Ohio included-treats all privi-
leges in exactly the way described in our model. Second, in Ohio, as
in most states, privileges are statutory, and the principles described
must filter through canons of statutory interpretation before they can
exert any effect. The question for Ohio's courts has been what charac-
teristics the legislature has given to the privilege.
Ohio has all the privileges used as examples in the preceding dis-
cussion. The Constitution 0 provides that ". . . no person shall be
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; .. 2'
In Orum v. State, the accused was being prosecuted for incest with his
daughter. He objected to questions put to her by the prosecutor, on
the ground that they would incriminate her. The daughter claimed
the privilege, and refused to testify until the court ordered her to do so.
On appeal from defendant's conviction, the court of appeals reviewed
the authorities from other states, found the privilege a personal one,
and announced the rule in its third syllabus:
In such a case, if a witness refuses to answer a question on the
ground that the answer solicited would incriminate him, and the
court disregards the claim of the witness, and requires him to
answer, the defendant has no right to object, and it is not reversible
error in the reviewing court even if the trial court erred in requir-
ing the witness to answer and the testimony of the witness tended
to prove the defendant guilty of the crime charged. 1
The view has been followed since; 2 and although the Ohio Supreme
Court has not met the problem, there seems no reason to doubt that it
would approve, since it has spoken of the privilege as being personal
9 Ohio cases hold that an attorney or physician may stand on his refusal and
test the order to disclose in contempt proceedings or by habeas corpus. In re Bates,
167 Ohio St. 46, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957); Ex parte Hurin, 59 Ohio App. 82, 17 N.E.2d
287 (1938).
I' Ohio Const. art. I, § 10 (1912).
11 Orum v. State, 38 Ohio App. 171, 175 N.E. 876 (1931).
12 State ex rel. Simons v. Kiser, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 98 N.E.2d 322 (Ct. App.
1950); In re Leiby's Estate, 60 Ohio L. Abs. 243, 101 N.E.2d 214 (Ct. App. 1950).
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to the witness, and since this is the universal mode of handling this
privilege.
1 3
It can be seen from the Orum case that with respect to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, Ohio's position accords completely
with the principles previously stated, as developed in the Uniform
Rules. The case could have been substituted for Illustration 2 without
changing anything but the name of the privilege.
The Ohio Revised Code, after declaring that all persons are com-
petent witnesses except those too young or too mentally unsound to
testify, 4 provides in the next following section under the heading
"Privileged Communications and Acts," that:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(A) An attorney, concerning [communications with his client];
or a physician, concerning [communications with his patient]; but
the attorney or physician may testify by express consent of the
client or patient, or if the client or patient be deceased, by the
express consent of [the surviving spouse or personal representa-
tive] ; and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies, the attorney
or physician may be compelled to testify on the same subject .... 1c
Since the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges are
worded identically in the statute, they will be considered together.
Swetland v. Miles16 was a will contest. As a matter of what com-
munications are privileged, the Uniform Rules, the Model Code, and
the majority of courts hold that no privilege exists in a case where all
parties claim under the same client or patient. The Ohio court's han-
dling of the problem of standing to assert a privilege can, however, be
compared with our principles on the assumption that a privilege does
exist. The proponents of the will called the attorney of the testatrix as
a witness and sought to elicit communications between him and his
client. The statute did not then contain the provision for waiver by a
representative of the dead client. Whether the attorney claimed the
privilege does not appear, but "upon objection," the trial judge
refused to admit the communications. On appeal his action was
affirmed. The reasoning was that the communication was privileged
in nature, that no waiver by the client had been made, and that no
one else was authorized by the statute to waive the privilege. There
was no discussion of the question who could claim, as distinct from
who could waive, the privilege. It can be seen that this case resembles
13 See Burke v. State, 104. Ohio St. 220, 135 N.E. 644 (1922); State v. Cox, 87
Ohio St. 313, 101 N.E. 135 (1913). The cases are collected in 8 Wigrnore § 2270.
14 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.01 (1953).
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (1953).
16 101 Ohio St. 501, 130 N.E. 22 (1920).
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Illustration 7, given above in the comments on the Uniform Rules,
with two differences. One was the Ohio court's refusal to allow waiver
by the personal representative of the deceased client. More important
is the position that no claim of privilege by the client's representative
or the attorney was necessary to bring the privilege into operation.
The position of the Uniform Rules is that absent a claim by the holder
or his authorized representative, the privilege should not be recog-
nized. Swetland holds that if the existence of the privilege is known to
the judge, from whatever source, and there has been no waiver of it,
a ruling protecting the privilege is not error. This differs from the
method by which self-incrimination is handled, but parallels the
Model Code which contained in its Rule 105(e) a provision that the
judge could, on his own motion, sustain the privilege of an absent
person. The provision was eliminated from the Uniform Rules.
As previously noted, most courts, the Uniform Rules, and the
Model Code would not reach the question, because they hold the privi-
lege completely inapplicable in cases where all parties claim under the
same client or patient. Given the existence of a privilege, however,
the handling of standing to assert in Swetland comports with that of
most courts and the Model Code.
What Ohio would do when the trial judge erroneously admitted
the communication was answered in Collins v. Collins,17 another will
contest. Contestant claimed that a codicil, which revoked certain
items, had itself been revoked without reviving those items. The
principal defendant appears to have been testator's son, who was
named executor and as a legatee would receive most of the estate if
the original items stood effective. Our statute still did not contain the
provision for waiver by the spouse or personal representative of a dead
client. All parties thus claimed under the will, the dispute being over
what it contained. Contestant called testator's attorney, and over
defendant's objection he testified, in effect, to communications from
testator. The supreme court held that judgment for contestant should
be reversed for this error. It assumed without discussion that de-
fendants could claim the privilege and predicate error on its denial.
The Uniform Rules would render the privilege nonexistent in
such a case, but given its existence, the holding in Collins is consistent
with the Rules' method of handling. The executor was authorized to
claim the testator's privilege; he undoubtedly was one of those who
objected, and Rule 40 would allow him to predicate error on the ruling
refusing recognition. The case parallels Illustration 6. It should be
noted that the result would be the same if the statute were treated as
17 110 Ohio St. 105, 143 N.E. 561 (1924).
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a rule of exclusion, available to any litigant, and the language of the
opinion does not reject that notion.
Industrial Commission v. Warnke 8 presented facts calling more
clearly for a decision on standing to assert the privilege. In that case,
a widow sought workmen's compensation death benefits. The statute
still did not contain the provision for waiver by the widow. She offered
the testimony of decedent's physician to show his physical condition
before and after the accident, and the Commission objected on the
ground of privileged communication. The trial court admitted the
evidence. The supreme court affirmed the ruling, but it did so by
holding that the statute impliedly authorized the widow to waive the
privilege and that she had done so. A dissent said that the result was
desirable, but was not authorized by the statute's waiver provisions.
It must be counted a misfortune that the question of who may
assert the privilege was not fully considered by the court, since
application of the principles described would have enabled the case
to be affirmed by a unanimous court. Both the Uniform Rules and the
Model Code recognize the existence of the privilege in a case like this.
It was created for the benefit of the patient and for him alone. The
Commission, a stranger to the relationship being fostered, had no in-
terest in it whatever, and no standing to assert it or to claim error on its
denial. If control of the privilege did not pass to anyone on decedent's
death (as the dissent said power to waive did not), then no one in the
case had standing to assert the privilege or predicate error on the failure
to recognize it. If control did pass to the widow, as the majority said
it did, then only she could claim the privilege and she did not do so.
In either event, the Commission was not entitled to claim it, nor to
predicate error on the ruling admitting the evidence. The court came
to the verge of this position when it said the statute "was intended
to shield and protect the patient from disgrace and humiliation,"
adding, "He cannot be hurt. He is dead." It then quoted approvingly
from a Washington case: "It is a universal rule that the question of
privilege, with respect to the communications offered in evidence, can
be invoked only by the author of the communication. It is a personal
privilege." 9 Instead of saying that neither the author of the com-
munication nor any one authorized to act for him had invoked the
privilege and thus ending the matter, the majority proceeded to create
the hybrid set of relations in which: (1) the patient when alive had a
privilege to prevent disclosure; (2) in the absence of waiver, the
Industrial Commission, although a stranger to the protected relation,
18 131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N.E.2d 248 (1936).
19 In re Thomas' Estate, 165 Wash. 42, 51, 4 P.2d 837, 841 (1931).
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also had a privilege-even a right-to prevent disclosure; but (3) the
widow had a power to terminate both the Commission's privilege and
right by waiver, and she did so. The court criticized, but did not
expressly overrule, Swetland v. Miles on the point of power to waive
after death of the holder.
The last important case on this line before the statute was
amended to authorize waiver for a dead holder of a privilege was
Karcher v. State.0 The defendant was charged with committing a
criminal abortion. The victim died before the trial. The physician
who had treated the victim after the abortion was offered as a witness
by the State to testify that the victim had told him she had had an
abortion performed upon her. This was objected to by defendant as
hearsay and privileged, but the testimony was received by the trial
court. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, and as an alternative
ground of its holding dealt with the physician-patient privilege by
saying that "there was no express waiver of the privilege by the
patient, and consequently, the admission of the conversation in evi-
dence was clearly prohibited." Taking up the argument that the only
person who had standing to assert the privilege or claim error on its
violation was the patient, the court quoted Jones, Commentaries on
Evidence:
The great weight of authority, however, supports the view that the
defendant in a criminal prosecution has no right to object to the
testimony of a physician, with respect to the victim of the crime,
on the ground of privileged communication. 2'
The court then stated:
But where the victim is also a party to the crime, as for example
where the victim has consented to an abortion and survives, it has
been held that the testimony of the physician who attended her is
inadmissible under the rule of privileged communications. In such a
case the objection of the accused is valid and must be sustained.
People v. Murphy, 101 N.Y. 126, 4 N.E. 326, 54 Am. Rep. 661.22
The court did not discuss the holdings in other states, more of which
are the other way.23 It concluded by saying that:
[I]n view of the strict terms of our statute, making not only
the communication to the physician privileged, but the physician
an incompetent witness, this court is of the opinion that the declara-
20 155 Ohio St. 253, 98 N.E.2d 308 (1951).
21 5 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence § 2200 (2d ed. 1926).
22 Karcher v. State, supra note 20, at 260, 98 N.E.2d at 312.
23 Many decisions are collected in the Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 645 (1948); 8 Wigmore
§ 2385; 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 113 (1954).
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tion of Alice Bailey to her physician was incompetent evidence
and its admission in evidence constituted prejudicial error.
The choice of the rule of People v. Murphy seems unfortunate. The
patient was alive at the time of trial in that case, and the court
stressed that "the disclosure which tended to convict the prisoner
tended to convict her of a crime, or cast discredit and disgrace upon
her." In Karcher the patient was dead, so that no tendency to convict
her of crime or wound her feelings existed, although her reputation
could be said to exist and be subject to damage. If so, this damage
seems to have been done once and for all when the disclosure was
made in the trial court and was not undone by reversing the convic-
tion of someone else in an opinion which set forth the disclosure once
more. The court did not repeat its statement from the Warnke case,
that the holder was dead and could not be hurt. The New York cases
held the privilege not claimable by the defendant when the victim
was dead, although none of them was a case where damage to the
reputation of the dead victim could be foreseen. Within a decade of
the Karcher case, a lower New York court was able to say that the
then law of New York was that if the patient is a party, only he can
invoke the privilege; if the patient is not a party, no party can claim
the privilege; and that "under no circumstances whatsoever may a
defendant invoke his victim's privilege."24
The last statement of the Karcher opinion, that the strict terms
of our statutes not only privileged the communication but also made
the physician an "incompetent witness," is of more interest since it
wipes out the quotation from Jones' Commentaries. It says that the
rule is not merely one of privilege, but one of exclusion, intended to
benefit, and assertable by, any litigant. Since the statute does not use
the words "incompetent witness," its terms are not as strict as those
of statutes which do.
If we compare the "no person shall be compelled" of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination with the "shall not testify . . .but
. . .may testify with the express consent . . . ." of this privilege, it
is hard for the writer to see clearly why the first wording gives only
a privilege, while the other additionally gives all litigants a right to
exclude the testimony. Neither piece of legislation says anything about
who may predicate error on the denial of the privilege, and the doctrine
of Rule 40 represents the common-law rule.2" Nevertheless, the Ohio
24 People v. Preston, 13 Misc. 2d 802, 176 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Kings County Ct. 1958).
25 See Rex v. Kinglake, 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 499, 22 L.T.R. (ns.) 335 (Q.B. 1870);
Marston v. Downes, 1 Adolphus & Ellis 31 (K.B. 1834); Doe v. Date, 3 Q.B. 609
(1842); Model Code of Evidence 173 (1942).
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court seems to have turned to the view that in the case of these privi-
leges, legislation has made the testimony inadmissible and that any
litigant may predicate error on its admission. Prior to Karcher, the
holdings we have discussed produced results fairly close to those
which would have been reached under the Uniform Rules, except that
the Ohio court, in the attorney-client and physician-patient cases, treated
absence of waiver the same way as the Rules treat an authorized claim
of the privilege. As soon as the area of self-incrimination was left,
however, the language of the opinions changed. They approached the
idea that any litigant, even though a stranger to the interest on which
the privilege was based, could claim the privilege, and predicate error
on its denial. In Karcher, with the statement that not only privilege
but incompetency to testify was involved, a result was reached com-
pletely contrary to what Rule 40 would produce.
The amendment of 1953 to the attorney-client and physician-
patient statute expressly gives a power of waiver to specified repre-
sentatives after the death of the client or patient. Its effect upon some
of the cases discussed is apparent; but it does not, of course, touch
directly the question of standing to claim the privileges or predicate
error thereon, except as it can be claimed to be an implied approval
of the rest of the Ohio position because it did not make any other
changes.2
The privilege for marital communications states that:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
(C) Husband or wife, concerning any communication made by
one to the other, or an act done by either in the presence of the
other during coverture [if the statute's definition of confidential
applies] and such rule is the same [after the marriage terminates] .27
The early case of Sessions v. Trevitt,28 affirming the admission of
a communication which under the statute was nonconfidential, de-
scribed the purpose of the statute:
Communications between husband and wife are not excluded on
the ground of their common interest, or for the protection of those
against whom they testify, but because public policy requires that
they shall not be allowed to betray the trust and confidence which
are essential to the happiness of the married state.
This Delphic statement suggests that no person other than the
26 This amendment is discussed in Ball, "Waiver of the Attorney-Client and
Physician-Patient Privileges," 14 Ohio St. L.J. 432 (1953), reprinted in Fryer, Selected
Writings on Evidence and Trial 204 (1957).
27 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (1953). In criminal cases, see Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.42
(1953).
28 Sessions v. Trevitt, 39 Ohio St. 259 (1883).
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spouses has any interest in the privilege; but the statement that it does
not exist because of their common interest, if it means something dif-
ferent, might exclude them from control over it as well. This could
lead to the conclusion that when a trial judge erroneously refuses to
recognize the privilege, the matter is solely between the judge and
the State, and no person, not even a spouse who is a party, could
predicate error on the ruling.
In Dick v. Hyer, 9 a husband and wife executed a cognovit note.
Judgment was obtained against both of them on the warrant of attor-
ney. Within term, the wife had this set aside, and filed answer alleging
material alteration. There were three trials below. At all of them,
apparently, the wife was allowed to testify over the objection of the
plaintiff that her husband brought the note to her while they were
alone, requested her to sign it, and that when she signed it, it was
dated January 5. The instrument sued on read January 4. At the
first trial the husband testified that no one had altered the note in
any way before his wife signed it. This trial resulted in a mistrial for
illness of a juror. By the time of the second trial the wife had obtained
a divorce. At this trial they both testified as before. The jury was dis-
charged for inability to agree. At the third trial the wife testified as
before, but the husband testified that he had himself altered the date
prior to the time his wife signed it. The third trial resulted in verdict
and judgment in favor of the wife and against plaintiff, and in favor
of plaintiff against the husband.
On appeal by plaintiff, the Ohio Supreme Court held that allow-
ing the wife to testify was reversible error. The question of standing
to assert the privilege or of waiver by the holder was not discussed.
The knowledge of the note's appearance obtained by the wife was
found to be a privileged communication. The court said that her
testimony was not "competent," and that if husband or wife is per-
mitted to testify thereto, "the purpose of the statute fails and the
confidential relation of husband and wife is imperiled or destroyed."
Here the Ohio departure from the view of the Uniform Rules was
complete. Under Rule 28 the husband was the person who had com-
municated the contents of the note to his wife and therefore the holder
of the privilege and the only person having standing to assert it. Even
if he did so, which is refuted by the facts, he did not appeal, and by
Rule 40, the plaintiff was not entitled to predicate error on the judge's
ruling failing to recognize it.
Wigmore comments on the Hyer case: "here the privilege is ab-
surdly made to exclude testimony which both husband and wife desire
29 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N.E. 251 (1916).
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to offer, waiving their privilege. ' 30 Since the parties were divorced,
and the admission of the wife's testimony resulted in a verdict in her
favor and against him, and since her testimony contradicted the
husband's, it is hard for this writer to be so sure that the husband
wanted the wife's testimony admitted. On the point of waiver, the
husband's testimony at the third trial did not necessarily amount to
waiver. He could testify that he changed the date before she signed,
without testifying about their communications. However, at the first
and second trials, he testified that the date was not altered by anybody
before the wife signed it. This testimony would have to cover the
time when she looked at it, in order to cover the time until signing.
If so, it would seem to be testimony to his communication, and a
waiver. A waiver once made is held to be good at least for the proceed-
ing in which it is made."
The simpler reason for criticizing the result in Ilyer would
seem to be the one previously given, since it would not raise the
question of the absence from the statute of any express provision for
waiver.
The supreme court's next case involving the statute was Ruch v.
State,32 a prosecution for perjury. The defendant's ex-wife was called
by the State and testified to communications made by him to her
during coverture which fitted the statute's definition of confidential.
No objection was made by defendant, and no motion to strike or with-
draw the evidence. On his appeal from conviction, the court said that
he had "waived the provisions of [the privilege statute] in his behalf,
and the admission of such testimony under such circumstances will
not constitute reversible error." The court did not mention Dick v.
.Uyer, and said it had not met this problem before, but Ruch is some-
times described as if it impliedly overruled the "no waiver" result
reached in the former case. The court certainly states that the privi-
lege was waived. The holding of Ruch, however, requires only the
proposition that a litigant, by failing to object, can waive error in
applying an evidence rule, whether his standing to complain is as liti-
gant or as holder of a privilege, and whether the rule is one of exclusion
or of privilege.
The picture presented by these Ohio cases seems to be this. When
the privilege against self-incrimination is applicable, only the holder
of the privilege can claim it, and when he is not a party, no party can
30 8 Wigmore § 2340 n.5.
31 Pendleton v. Pendleton, 103 Ohio App. 345, 145 N.E.2d 485 (1957); 8 Wigmore
§ 2328; McCormick § 97.
32 111 Ohio St. 580, 146 N.E. 67 (1924).
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make the claim or predicate error on its denial. When any of the other
privileges is applicable, any litigant can claim it, and predicate error
on its denial, unless it has been waived by its holder. Whether any
person not expressly authorized by statute to waive can waive is doubt-
ful, but the dicta of Warnke and Ruch give an affirmative answer,
while the earlier holdings of Swetland and Hyer give a negative.
Description of the divergence between the Ohio position and
that of the Uniform Rules does not explain it; and in the case of
Rule 40, which is the common-law rule, it is not easy to explain.
Wigmore has suggested that "playing the game" according to the rules
may have an influenceY3 If this means reversing the trial judge when-
ever the judge's mistaken denial of a personal privilege of A does
harm to the case of B, it seems inconsistent not to do so in the case
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Neither Ohio nor any other
state shows signs of changing that rule.
The Ohio opinions, to the extent that they discuss the matter at
all, say that the legislature has made the privileges into rules of com-
petency to be a witness, and thus into rules of exclusion. It is whip-
ping a long-dead horse to point out again that the legislature made
only two exceptions to general competency in another section of the
Code dealing with competency, and that the privilege section does not
use the word competency, nor say anything about changing the
common-law rule as to standing to claim a privilege. No one would
contend that the words "incompetent to be a witness" should be
injected into these privilege provisions because the testimony is un-
reliable. The chief legislative sanction for the interpretation seems to
be the legislature's failure to repudiate it rather than the words of
the statute. For Ohio to turn to the common-law rule on standing to
claim all privileges, rather than applying it to self-incrimination alone,
would require legislative enactment of a provision like Uniform
Rule 40.
33 8 Wigmore § 2196, at 112-113. He also mentions "failure to comprehend the
issue."
